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Abstract. We present a collaborative prepositioning strategy to strengthen the disaster preparedness of the
Caribbean countries, which are frequently hit by hurricanes. Since different subsets of countries are affected
in each hurricane season, significant risk pooling benefits can be achieved through horizontal collaboration,
which involves joint ownership of prepositioned stocks. We worked with the inter-governmental Caribbean
Disaster and Emergency Management Agency to design a collaborative prepositioning network in order to
improve regional response capacity. We propose a novel insurance-based method to allocate the costs incurred
to establish and operate the proposed collaborative prepositioning network among the partner countries. We
present a stochastic programming model, which determines the locations and amounts of relief supplies to
store, as well as the investment to be made by each country such that their premium is related to the cost
associated with the expected value and the standard deviation of their demand. We develop a realistic data
set for the network by processing real-world data. We conduct extensive numerical analyses and present
insights that support practical implementation. We show that a significant reduction in total inventory
can be achieved by applying collaborative prepositioning as opposed to a decentralized policy. Our results
also demonstrate that reducing the replenishment lead time during the hurricane season and improving sea
connectivity is essential to increasing the benefits resulting from the network.
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We design a collaborative prepositioning network for disaster preparedness in the Caribbean,
a region vulnerable to a variety of disasters, including storms, hurricanes, floods and earth-
quakes. We focus on hurricanes which have been a consistent burden on the small islands of
the Caribbean, and have inflicted significant losses in the region (Kirton, 2013). For instance,
in 2004, the direct losses and property damage in the Caribbean were estimated at USD two
billion. The year 2017 was the second most costly in history, when three major hurricanes,
Harvey, Irma and Maria, affected the United States and the Caribbean (CRED, 2018). That
year, 96% of Dominica’s population was affected by hurricane Maria, while the British Virgin
Islands lost the equivalent of 284% of their GDP following hurricane Irma (CRED, 2018).
The Caribbean countries are often hit by multiple storms during an Atlantic hurricane season,
which extends from June 1 to November 30, with a peak in September. These storms form in
the warm waters of the Atlantic, which can be as far east as Africa. Each storm may follow a
different track while passing through the Caribbean, and the severity of a storm may change
along its track. Therefore, a storm reaching the Caribbean region may affect multiple countries
simultaneously at different levels. Historical data indicate that different subsets of Caribbean
countries have been affected in each season. It therefore makes sense to develop a disaster
preparedness strategy based on risk pooling in order to enhance the region’s response capacity.
The inter-governmental Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA)
was established to strengthen regional integration in disaster management (Kirton, 2013). To
coordinate the relief efforts, CDEMA divides the region into four subregions, each headed by a
subregional focal point. However, logistical and material limitations have hindered the efficient
functioning of the current system. In particular, due to the absence of dedicated storage facilities
and transportation assets, ad hoc measures must be put into place after the occurrence of
a disaster, which prevents a quick mobilization of the resources (Kirton, 2013). The current
head of CDEMA mentioned to us that the regional prepositioning decisions (location of the
warehouses and amount of inventory) have not been determined by scientific methods, and it
would be useful to evaluate the current network by considering logistical infrastructure and
capacity, as well as disaster risks (CDEMA, 2018). We introduce a systematic methodology that
can support CDEMA’s decisions for the design and management of a strongly coordinated and
adequately financed regional prepositioning network to better cope with the effects of strong
weather events in the Caribbean.
Prepositioning, which involves storing relief supplies at strategic locations to reach disaster-
prone regions when needed, is a widely applied disaster preparedness strategy. For instance,
the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) and the International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) operate several facilities around the world,
which keep emergency stocks to provide immediate assistance to the affected areas. However,
in the humanitarian sector, the prepositioned stocks are traditionally owned and managed by
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a single agency, and different agencies make prepositioning decisions independently (Acimovic
and Goentzel, 2016). Given the uncertainties in the timing, location and impact of disasters,
prepositioning can be very expensive, and only a few agencies can cover the warehousing and
inventory holding costs associated with it (Balcik and Beamon, 2008).
Our collaborative prepositioning strategy should help different countries coordinate their
actions and generate risk pooling benefits. The proposed network keeps a cumulative amount of
inventory of relief supplies in warehouses, which can reach the countries affected by a hurricane
within a preset response time by air or by sea. We characterize the uncertainties related to
hurricane occurrences and impacts by discrete scenarios. Specifically, each scenario specifies
the set of countries that may be affected in a hurricane season, the timing of the hurricane,
and the estimated demand for relief supplies in these countries. Moreover, we assume that
warehouses may be damaged and that transportation capacity and connectivity may decrease
depending on the severity of the hurricane. Hence, the decisions associated with the physical
infrastructure of the proposed collaborative network involve determining the locations of the
regional warehouses and the amount of inventory to store at each warehouse. Furthermore, in
order for the network to be sustainable, it is essential to develop a transparent and fair cost
sharing system that specifies the benefits and costs associated with this collaborative mechanism
for the partner countries. In this study, we present a novel methodology to determine the amount
of investment to be made by each partner country to establish and run the collaborative network.
In particular, inspired by the Caribbean Catastrophic Relief Insurance Facility (CCRIF), which
is a risk pooling mechanism for providing catastrophe funds to the Caribbean countries affected
by disasters, we develop an insurance framework to determine the costs and benefits for each
country. Accordingly, the payoff for the partners is the demand coverage and logistical service
provided, while the premiums depend on the costs and risks transferred by the countries to the
partnership. We develop a two-stage stochastic programming model that links network design
decisions with cost allocation decisions. To test our model and obtain implementable results, we
gathered real-world data from our project partners and public data sources. We illustrate the
implementation of the proposed model on the Caribbean network, present numerical analyses to
test the effect of different system parameters, and generate insights. While we particularly focus
on the Caribbean region in this study, the proposed approach is generalizable to other settings
in which regional integration can yield risk pooling benefits for the collaborating entities such
as countries that are prone to similar disasters or agencies that respond to them.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In §2, we position our study within
the related literature. In §3, we provide an overview of the disaster management efforts in the
Caribbean. In §4, we describe the collaborative prepositioning network design problem, present
the mathematical model, and discuss its analytical properties. We explain the details of the
data collection process and perform numerical analyses in §5. Finally, we conclude and discuss
future work in §6.
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2. Positioning of the Study
In this section, we position our study within the relevant streams of the literature.
2.1. Prepositioning Network Design
Problems related to designing humanitarian prepositioning networks have received considerable
attention over the past decade. A growing number of studies address prepositioning problems
and present mathematical models to determine the location of the warehouses and the amount
of inventory to hold at each facility. We refer the reader to Anaya-Arenas et al. (2014) and
Balcik et al. (2016), which review relevant prepositioning problems.
Our study shares similarities with some known relief prepositioning problems. We consider
strategic prepositioning of supplies to prepare for hurricanes, as in Rawls and Turnquist (2010)
and Galindo and Batta (2013). We note that Lodree et al. (2012), Davis et al. (2013) and
Pacheco and Batta (2016) also consider prepositioning for hurricane preparedness; however,
their studies focus on short-term prepositioning of supplies after a hurricane warning has been
received. Similarly to the majority of prepositioning studies, we consider the possibility of dam-
ages to the facilities, stocks and transportation network as a result of the disaster. One of the
differentiating aspects of our study is that we consider multiple events that may occur through-
out a hurricane season, each of which may affect multiple countries. Furthermore, we model the
replenishment of warehouses within a season, which has not been considered by studies that
focus on strategic prepositioning. Since the exact location, timing and impact of disasters are
not known in advance, prepositioning decisions are made under uncertainty. Two-stage stochas-
tic programming has already been used to model the uncertainties in prepositioning problems
(e.g., Salmerón and Apte, 2010). In general, prepositioning decisions are made in the first stage
(before the disaster), while considering the implications of supply distribution decisions made in
the second stage once uncertainty has been lifted (after the disaster). The uncertainties related
to disaster occurrences are generally represented by a set of discrete scenarios, which are gen-
erated by using historical data. We refer the reader to Grass and Fischer (2016) for a review of
two-stage stochastic programming applications in humanitarian logistics.
Relatively few studies are empirically grounded and performed in collaboration with human-
itarian agencies. Duran et al. (2011) focus on designing a global prepositioning network for
CARE International. McCoy and Brandeau (2011) develop stockpiling and shipping policies
for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to support internally dis-
placed people. Jahre et al. (2016) also focus on the UNHCR and present a prepositioning model
that integrates short-term emergency response and longer-term development operations. Charles
et al. (2016) develop a model to support IFRC’s global warehouse location decisions. Toyasaki
et al. (2017) consider multi-agency inventory planning within a UNHRD depot. Dufour et al.
(2018) solve a network design problem for the UNHRD operations in East Africa. Arnette and
Zobel (2018) model and solve a prepositioning problem encountered by the American Red Cross
to locate the assets needed to open shelters for temporarily displaced people. Here we conduct a
study in collaboration with an inter-governmental agency, CDEMA, which coordinates disaster
preparedness and response efforts of several Caribbean countries.
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2.2. Collaborative Humanitarian Supply Chains
While the benefits and needs of improving collaboration among humanitarian stakeholders have
been consistently highlighted (Balcik et al., 2010; Jahre and Jensen, 2010), very few studies
analytically explore collaborative humanitarian settings. Davis et al. (2013) focus on the allo-
cation of prepositioned supplies among local agencies, which relocate the existing inventory
among facilities based on short-term forecasts for an approaching hurricane. Bhattacharya et al.
(2014) address the coordination of agencies running independent programs funded by earmarked
donations. Coles et al. (2018) apply game theory to find compatible partners to work with
during disaster response. Ergun et al. (2014) focus on using information technology tools col-
laboratively to manage multiple camps serving internally displaced people after an earthquake,
and present a game theory framework to allocate the associated costs and benefits among the
agencies. Toyasaki et al. (2017) use non-cooperative game theory to explore the horizontal coop-
eration of multiple agencies to manage their inventories in a UNHRD depot by exchanging stocks
after a disaster. Acimovic and Goentzel (2016) introduce metrics to describe system capacity
across many agents that store inventory at different locations and show that the system can be
improved through coordination and inventory repositioning.
Traditionally, both in the scientific literature and in the real world, emergency relief stocks
have been owned and managed by a single agency, which determines the locations of the ware-
houses and the amount of inventory to hold at each facility. However, such independent preposi-
tioning decisions may result in imbalanced and ineffective distribution of stocks (Acimovic and
Goentzel, 2016). Moreover, for each agency, stocking supplies in anticipation of low-probability
disastrous events may lead to disproportionate investments and costs (Kunz et al., 2014). In
practice, some established structures such as UNHRD, IFRC, and Logistics Cluster encourage
resource sharing among humanitarian actors. De Leeuw et al. (2010) discuss the efforts of the
Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster, which involves 17 organizations led by UNICEF,
to generate shared humanitarian stockpiles, which can support up to 50,000 beneficiaries and
must be positioned around the world so that materials can be delivered to the agencies within
one week.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to model and solve a multi-country collab-
orative prepositioning network design problem. While this study was conducted in collaboration
with CDEMA, it can be adapted to other multi-country or multi-agency settings.
2.3. Insurance Framework
Whereas there exists abundant research on insurance theory, the ideas and methods from this
field have not been widely utilized to mitigate risks in humanitarian supply chains or in commer-
cial supply chains (Friday et al., 2018). As discussed by Lodree and Taskin (2008), an insurance
framework can easily be related to quantifying the risks and benefits associated with disaster
preparedness. Lodree and Taskin (2008) use such a framework to determine the amount of inven-
tory that a single agency must preposition in order to prepare for a disaster. Some management
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science papers also make use of insurance-based methods to mitigate business interruptions. For
example, Serpa and Krishnan (2016) study a two-firm setting in which insurance is used as a
commitment mechanism to avoid free riding when coping with business interruptions. Lin et al.
(2010) and Dong and Tomlin (2012) study the interactions between insurance and inventory
management to mitigate supply chain disruption risks for a single firm.
Here we present an insurance framework to allocate the costs associated with the collaborative
network among its members. To our knowledge, our study is the first to use insurance premium
calculation principles to support collaboration among humanitarian actors.
3. Background: Caribbean Disaster Management
The Caribbean community views regional integration as an important means of improving effi-
ciency, generating economies of scale, and promoting stable growth, because the region consists
mainly of states with small and geographically isolated economies, which may not have sufficient
resources to make large public investments (Bishop et al., 2011). Several institutions have been
established to support regional integration in various dimensions (such as trade, environment
and security). Quite importantly, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)
is a free-trade zone that was launched in 1973 to promote regional integration and cooper-
ation. CARICOM currently has 15 member states: Antigua and Barbuda (ATG), Bahamas
(BHS), Barbados (BRB), Belize (BLZ), Dominica (DMA), Grenada (GRD), Guyana (GUY),
Haiti (HTI), Jamaica (JAM), Montserrat (MST), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), Saint Kitts and
Nevis (KNA), Saint Lucia (LCA), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (VCT), and Suriname
(SUR). There are also five associate members: Anguilla (AIA), Bermuda (BMU), the British
Virgin Islands (BVI), the Cayman Islands (CYM), and the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCA).
These 20 CARICOM states, which constitute our region of interest, are depicted in Figure 1.
Two important initiatives were established to improve regional disaster management capacity
in the Caribbean, which are also unique examples for the humanitarian community; namely, the
CDEMA and the Caribbean Catastrophic Relief Insurance Facility (CCRIF) support horizontal
coordination in disaster management, which will be briefly described below.
3.1. The Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA)
CDEMA is a regional inter-governmental agency for disaster management, established in 2007
to “strengthen capacity for the mitigation, management and response to all hazards at the
regional, national and community levels and to ensure coordination in all phases of disasters”
(Kirton, 2013). It currently comprises 18 participating states, including all of the CARICOM
members, except BMU and the CYM. It is headquartered in BRB, and the national disaster
offices at each country execute CDEMA’s activities (Kirton, 2013).
To manage and coordinate regional disaster relief efforts, CDEMA designated four countries
as subregional focal points, each responsible for three or four countries in the region (Figure
1). The focal points were selected by considering their proximity, as well as their cultural and
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Figure 1 Region of interest with the current subregional focal points and the 18 countries covered by CDEMA
economic similarities to other countries in the subregion (Kirton, 2013). To meet the operating
expenses of this system, the member states contribute to an annual budget on the basis of their
economic standing and risk factors (CDEMA, 2018). Specifically, each country pays a pre-agreed
fixed percentage of the total prepositioning costs.
We present to CDEMA a systematic methodology for the design of a collaborative preposi-
tioning network by incorporating important regional factors such as hurricane risks, transporta-
tion infrastructure, logistical connectivity, and costs. Furthermore, we propose a cost allocation
strategy linked with the network design decisions.
3.2. The Caribbean Catastrophic Relief Insurance Facility (CCRIF)
The CCRIF is a not-for-profit structure designed to limit the financial impact of devastating
hurricanes and earthquakes in the Caribbean by quickly providing financial liquidity to the
affected countries in order to support the relief efforts (CCRIF, 2018). The CCRIF was estab-
lished in 2004 after Hurricane Ivan, through funding from multiple donors such as Canada, the
Caribbean Development Bank, the European Union, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the World Bank, and through membership fees from the participating governments (CCRIF,
2018). Currently, 16 of the 20 CARICOM countries are involved in CCRIF.
The CCRIF is the first “multi-country, multi-peril pooled catastrophe risk insurance facility”
in the world, which allows pooling the catastrophe risks of multiple countries into a single port-
folio (World Bank, 2012). Since disaster losses in the Caribbean countries can exceed multiples
of their GDP, these countries cannot individually absorb the financial impact of the disasters
(World Bank, 2012). Through CCRIF, the members can obtain insurance coverage at lower
prices. More specifically, the price that the countries pay to CCRIF is less than half what they
would pay for purchasing insurance individually through international markets (CCRIF, 2012).
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Through CCRIF, the countries can receive a prompt cash payout within 14 days following a
covered event, which is made possible because CCRIF pays based on parametric triggers such as
predetermined wind speeds for hurricanes, but not on the actual losses, which can take months
to assess on-site (CCRIF, 2018). The CCRIF policies are renewed for one year at the beginning
of the hurricane season. Countries buy coverage up to USD 100 million for a given year, and
there is no limit on the number of events a policy can cover (CCRIF, 2018). The payouts are
based on the estimated losses calculated through a hazard loss model, and on the purchased
coverage amounts. To date, CCRIF has made 22 payments to 10 countries, totaling USD 69
million (CCRIF, 2017). The country premiums are based on the coverage chosen by a country
and on its risk profile, which depends on historical events. The premiums, which vary typically
from USD 200,000 to USD 4,000,000, are paid by countries and donors (CCRIF, 2017).
In our study, we are motivated by CCRIF and we integrate an insurance-based framework
into collaborative prepositioning, which determines country contributions by considering the
needs of the partner countries and the risk they translate to the network, and also the regional
logistical connectivity and costs.
4. Collaborative Prepositioning Network Design
We now define the collaborative prepositioning network design problem (§4.1) and present our
mathematical model (§4.2).
4.1. Problem Definition
We focus on designing a collaborative prepositioning network in the Caribbean to support
CDEMA’s efforts to improve disaster preparedness and response capacity. Since extreme weather
events such as hurricanes occur frequently in the Caribbean, and each event may affect a dif-
ferent set of states depending on its path, collaborative prepositioning could help the CDEMA
countries benefit from risk pooling and resource sharing in order to cope with the immediate
consequences of disasters. In the proposed collaborative prepositioning strategy, CDEMA will
serve as an umbrella organization and will engage its members to become partners for keeping
joint stocks for emergency relief supplies in a set of warehouses strategically located in the region.
Additionally, we present an insurance-based framework to provide a sustainable financing mech-
anism. More specifically, the collaborative prepositioning network design problem determines i)
the number and location of the warehouses to be established in the region, ii) the amount of
inventory for emergency relief supplies to hold at each warehouse, iii) the investment needed to
set up this collaborative network and to manage it for the first year, and iv) the premium to be
paid by each partner country, while considering the uncertainties in demands for relief supplies,
which may occur in multiple countries due to possible storm events throughout a hurricane
season. We next describe the collaborative prepositioning network design problem in detail.
9
4.1.1. Network We consider a set of Caribbean countries affected by weather-related
events such as hurricanes. Due to the geographical positions of these countries, a storm may
hit several countries at different levels, and each country may be hit by multiple storms in the
same season. Once a strong storm occurs, people may lose access to basic items and needs may
arise for large amounts of emergency relief supplies. If a country’s national response capacity is
overwhelmed by the disaster, it is critical to quickly send relief items to the affected regions to
save lives and support the survivors. We assume that all CARICOM states, which are under risk
of being affected by a strong storm, can be partners of the collaborative prepositioning network.
The candidate warehouse locations are also selected among these countries by evaluating their
logistical infrastructure, connectivity to the region, and disaster risk. We assume that there can
be multiple warehouses at each chosen location; however, the maximum number of warehouses
per country is limited. Each warehouse has a fixed capacity in terms of the number of items it
can store.
4.1.2. Planning Horizon and Scenarios The collaborative prepositioning network will
hold sufficient inventory to cover the needs of the partners over the planning horizon, which
is one hurricane season. While the Atlantic hurricane season is officially between June 1 and
November 30, there may be off-season storms in some years. Based on our analysis of historical
hurricane data, the planning horizon in our study extends from May 1 to December 31. These
data show that multiple events have occurred in 80% of the seasons and that multiple countries
have been affected simultaneously in 55% of the events. For instance, 10 events hit the Caribbean
region in 2005, affecting nine countries throughout the season, four of which at least twice.
To assign a time period for each event, we divide the planning horizon into two-week periods.
Anytime multiple events occur in the same two-week period, we aggregate the demand of these
events and work with a single event with the accumulated demand.
While making collaborative prepositioning network decisions, one should consider the uncer-
tainties in the number, severity and timing of strong storms that may hit the region in future
seasons. To this end, we use a set of discrete scenarios to represent these uncertainties. Each sce-
nario specifies the number of storm events occurring throughout a hurricane season, the period
and the severity of each event, the set of affected countries, and the estimated demand in each
country. Note that because there is enough time to replenish the warehouses between two hurri-
cane seasons (four months), the demand between two consecutive seasons is memoryless. Thus,
modelling demand uncertainty using several scenarios representing a single season is equivalent
to considering multiple seasons over a longer planning horizon. We assume that the availabil-
ity of supplies at the warehouses and the connectivity of the transportation network are also
scenario-dependent; that is, if a country with a warehouse is hit by a storm, a percentage of its
supplies may not be used. Additionally, we assume that the logistical connectivity of an affected
country may decrease due to effects of the hurricane on the country’s logistical infrastructure.
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4.1.3. Targeted Demands We consider storing family kits in the network, which contain
a set of relief items such as blankets and hygiene kits necessary to support a family of five
people after a hurricane. Since the proposed collaborative network works like an insurance, it
must guarantee that the promised coverage amounts for the family kits can be provided to each
partner country within a preset response time. We assume that the collaborative network will
be designed to cover the targeted demands specified by the countries for each event category.
In other words, the total capacity of the network does not aim to cover all of the needs of
the affected countries in each event, but only the targeted demands. While implementing this
network, each country can specify its targeted demand by evaluating relevant country-specific
factors such as risk and vulnerability, national response capacity, logistical infrastructure, and
capacity of handling external aid such as the maximum estimated receiving port capacity (Starr
and Van Wassenhove, 2014). Since the countries’ actual evaluations on their targeted demands
are not currently available, in our numerical analyses, we set a country’s targeted demands
based on the historical percentage of the affected population and the number and strength of
previous events, as detailed in Appendix A. In this way, the targeted demands and the resulting
demand scenarios reflect the population exposure of the countries. Moreover, we impose that the
targeted demands do not exceed a prespecified maximum coverage limit (MCL) in our insurance-
inspired collaborative prepositioning network. In insurance theory, limits on coverage are used to
help insurers deal with huge losses (Cummins and Mahul, 2004), and most insurance contracts
involve a limit on coverage (Zhou et al., 2010). We set the base MCL value at 12,000 family kits
in numerical experiments, which is based on IFRC Panama’s weekly response capacity in the
region. In our numerical analyses, we test for different levels of MCL and also show the effects
of not using MCL on the network, on the costs and on the country premiums.
4.1.4. Transportation and Logistics When a disaster occurs, the supplies at the ware-
houses are mobilized immediately. Each warehouse can serve each country in each scenario as
long as the response time requirements are met. That is, in contrast to CDEMA’s current sys-
tem, we do not assign a fixed service area (subregion) to the chosen warehouses. We consider
two response time levels in our network: fast response (three days) and slower response (seven
days). The collaborative network must be able to satisfy a preset percentage of the targeted
demand of a country at the fast response level. We assume that the supplies can be shipped
from the warehouses to the affected countries via air or sea, depending on the transit times and
costs, and that the warehouses are located next to airports or ports, and hence do not require
extensive inland transportation.
4.1.5. Replenishment of the Warehouses There could be opportunities to replenish the
stocks at the warehouses throughout an eight-month hurricane season. This can be advantageous
since i) it allows the system to store less inventory and operate smaller warehouses, and ii) the
risk of losing supplies due to damaged warehouses can be reduced. The amount of replenishment

















Figure 2 Example of a hurricane season with three events. Between the first two there is time for replenish-
ment while this is not the case between the second and the third events.
an example focusing on the 1961 hurricane season, in which three hurricanes (Anna, Frances
and Hattie) hit the Caribbean in periods 6, 11 and 12. In such a case, when the lead time
is four periods, there is enough time for receiving orders made after the first event, while the
third event occurs before the warehouses can be replenished after the second event. In the
collaborative prepositioning network, replenishment orders are made at the end of each period.
The order amount at each warehouse is equal to the sum of the items used and damaged over
the past period. We assume a fixed lead time for each warehouse. The orders are received at
their respective warehouses at the beginning of the period after the lead time. Note that there is
enough time between the first and the second hurricanes to replenish the used supplies. However,
since there is no time for replenishment between the second and third hurricanes, there must
be sufficient items in the network at the beginning of time period 11 to cover the demands
of both hurricanes Frances and Hattie. Since the amount of storage needed in the network is
calculated by also considering the probability that some supplies may be damaged if warehouses
are affected, at time period 11 there will be enough items to respond to the disasters, even if
some warehouses will be hit by hurricanes Frances and Hattie. At the end of each hurricane
season, once the last replenishment orders have been received, the warehouses become full.
Therefore, between the end of the last season and the beginning of the next one (from January
to May), the inventory at the warehouses is not utilized in our setting. However, given that
the Caribbean is prone to a variety of disasters, the stocks can be used during this period to
respond to other events in the region. Additionally, it would be possible to share these stocks
with the humanitarian agencies operating in the region, such as the IFRC and the World Food
Programme. If any supplies are used during the off-season, they need to be replaced in the
warehouses before the beginning of the next hurricane season.
4.1.6. Costs and Budget The total initial investment required to set up the collabora-
tive prepositioning network includes the budget necessary to cover disaster preparedness and
emergency response costs for the first year. In particular, it includes the fixed cost of locating
warehouses (i.e., rent, equipment, and staff), the purchase cost of supplies for building the initial
cumulative inventory, the inventory holding cost, and the largest emergency response cost that
may occur in a season to cover the transportation and replenishment of supplies. Note that
the budget allocated to emergency response expenses can be held in the form of monetary liq-
uidities until needed. In our network, transportation costs depend on the transportation modes
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used, and on the origin and destination countries. Moreover, although the inventory level at
the warehouses may go down and up during a season, we charge inventory costs for the initial
cumulative amount since replenishment orders for the used stocks are given immediately at the
end of each period, and the warehouses are replenished up to their order-up-to level. Since the
warehouses and their contents are insured, any costs resulting from possible damages are not
additionally considered. Once the network is set up, at the end of each hurricane season, the
countries that have used supplies will pay for the materials and logistical services they have
received during the past season. Therefore, at the beginning of each season, the network will
have a fixed amount of prepositioned inventory and fixed monetary reserves to cover possible
emergencies.
After the first year, countries will have to pay an annual membership fee to maintain the
network (i.e., to cover costs for rent, staff, equipment maintenance, etc.). That is, to be a member
of the collaborative network, each country first makes a contribution to cover the total initial
investment (i.e., country premiums), and then pays for annual usage and membership fees. Our
collaborative prepositioning problem only focuses on optimizing the significant amount of total
initial investment required to cover the first year setup and management cost, whereas the annual
usage and membership fees can be calculated a posteriori. We next present a methodology
to fairly allocate the total initial investment among the countries through an insurance-based
framework.
4.1.7. Insurance Framework The proposed collaborative prepositioning network works
like an insurance, which specifies a payoff and a premium for each country. The payoff is the
demand coverage and logistical services provided to a country throughout a hurricane season.
More specifically, the network ensures that the targeted demands can be satisfied within a
week after a hurricane. In return, each partner country must pay a premium to cover the cost
associated with the total initial investment. We present a methodology, inspired by premium
calculation methods from actuarial science, to determine the contribution of each partner coun-
try to the total investment and set its premium by considering the costs a country transfers to
the partnership.
An insurance plan sets a relatively small premium to gain protection against a potentially
large future loss (Grossi et al., 2005). If an insuree is more susceptible to a specific risk, then the
cost for coverage against a loss from that risk is greater. Since insurance rates are regulated and
there is market competition, the premium may not fully reflect the underlying risk. Nevertheless,
several actuarial models can be used to estimate the risks. Natural disasters pose a challenging
set of problems for insurers compared with more frequent and non-extreme events such as car
accidents and fire, partly because of the absence of data available to model the risks and losses
for natural disasters, which occur infrequently and yield huge losses. For an insurance market to
be profitable, it must be able to issue a large number of policies whose losses are independent.
By pooling the uncorrelated risks faced by a large number of individuals, insurers can use the
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law of large numbers to essentially eliminate aggregate risk (Duncan and Myers, 2000). Since
the losses from catastrophes can be huge, having a large number of entities spread over different
regions would be beneficial, so that the insurer can collect sufficient premiums to cover large
losses from a single disaster. However, this is not the case when a multi-country setting is
considered. Our Caribbean network is made up of only 20 countries, which need to be insured
for the losses resulting from the same disasters. Fortunately, historical data indicate that a
different subset of countries is affected by the hurricanes in each season. Therefore, there may
be sufficient diversity in this setting to achieve risk pooling benefits.
Calculating an insurance premium implies determining “the price of risk” for a customer or
a group of customers (Deelstra and Plantin, 2014), and numerous premium calculation meth-
ods exist (Landsman and Sherris, 2001). We adopt one of the most common methods which
considers the expected value and the variability of risk. Specifically, let S denote a positive
real random variable, which represents future insurance claim amounts, and let Π(S) be the
premium associated to risk S. The pure premium principle states that the premium is equal
to the average risk level, that is, Π(S) =E(S). However, for catastrophic types of risk, setting
premiums based solely on the expected value may not be sufficient to cover losses associated
with extreme events. Therefore, insurees are often charged larger premiums than their expected
losses (Froot, 2001). There exist alternative premium calculation principles that consider other
characteristics of the risk distribution (Deelstra and Plantin, 2014; Kaluszka, 2001). Here, we
adopt the standard deviation principle, which adds a safety margin to the pure premium pro-
portional to the standard deviation of the risk: Π(S) = E(S) +
√
V ar(S)Z, where Z ≥ 0 is a
dimensionless deviation variable to be minimized.
Denote by Dc the random variable representing total targeted demand that may occur in
country c ∈ C in a hurricane season, and by E(Dc) and V ar(Dc) the expected value and the
variance of the demand. Moreover, let Yc denote the amount of investment allocated to part-
ner country c ∈ C, let B denote the total investment required for setting up the network, and
let b denote the estimated logistics cost per unit of supply in the network. We estimate b as
the average of some benchmark solutions obtained by solving a restricted version of the col-
laborative prepositioning network design problem, which does not involve cost sharing aspects.
The following two constraints are used to adapt the standard deviation procedure for setting
premiums in our problem:
bE(Dc)≤ Yc ≤ bE(Dc) + b
√
V ar(Dc)Z ∀c∈C (1)∑
c∈C
Yc ≥B. (2)
By minimizing Z, we will allocate costs among the countries in a fair way, so that each country
pays an amount that reflects the expectation and variance of its needs. Moreover, minimizing
Z implies that the network must be established by using the least investment possible.
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4.2. Mathematical Model
Given a set of countries, a set of candidate countries in which to locate warehouses, and a set
of scenarios that represent hurricane occurrences and demands, the collaborative prepositioning
network design problem determines the number and locations of the warehouses, the inventory
to hold at each warehouse, the required investment to set up and run the network, and the
country premiums. We next present the notation to formulate the problem.
Sets
S: set of scenarios; s∈ S
T : set of disaster periods in a hurricane season; t∈ T
C: set of countries in the partnership; c∈C
W : set of candidate warehouse locations; w ∈W
Ĉst: set of countries affected by a hurricane in period t∈ T of scenario s∈ S; c∈ Ĉst
M : set of transportation modes; m∈M
L: set of response levels; l= 1 for fast response and l= 2 for slower response; l ∈L
Ŵ scml: set of candidate warehouses that can cover country c ∈ C at response level l ∈ L via
transportation mode m∈M under scenario s∈ S; w ∈ Ŵ scml.
Parameters
dstc : targeted demand at country c∈C in period t∈ T in scenario s∈ S
ps: probability associated with scenario s∈ S
αstw : percentage of damaged supplies at location w ∈W in period t∈ T in scenario s∈ S
τ : replenishment lead time
ustwcm: unit transportation cost for shipping a family kit to country c∈C from location w ∈W sc
via mode m∈M in period t∈ T in scenario s∈ S
κw: maximum capacity of a warehouse at candidate location w ∈W
nw: maximum number of warehouses that can be located at candidate location w ∈W
fw: fixed location and operating costs for the first year for a warehouse at location w ∈W
(includes rent, equipment, staff and insurance for these assets)
rw: unit cost of purchasing a family kit for a warehouse at location w ∈W (includes purchasing,
insurance and inbound transportation costs)
gw: rw plus unit cost of holding an item in a warehouse at location w ∈W
βstc : percentage of demand of country c∈C to be covered at response level l= 1 during period
t∈ T in scenario s∈ S
b: estimated unit logistics cost (prepositioning and shipping one family kit in the network),
obtained by averaging some benchmark solutions of a restricted model
λ: weight for the deviation objective.
First-stage decision variables
Xw: number of warehouses to locate at candidate location w ∈W
Iw: amount of inventory to hold at candidate location w ∈W
15
Yc: premium of partner country c∈C
Z: maximum deviation variable
B0: total budget required to cover disaster preparedness costs
B1: total budget required to cover emergency response costs.
Second-stage decision variables
Qstwcm: amount of supplies delivered to country c ∈ C from candidate location w ∈ W sc via
transportation mode m∈M in period t∈ T in scenario s∈ S
Astw : amount of supplies available at candidate location w ∈W at the beginning of period t∈ T
in scenario s∈ S
Rstw : amount of replenishment that arrives at candidate location w ∈W at the beginning of
period t∈ T in scenario s∈ S.
We present a two-stage stochastic programming model for the collaborative prepositioning net-























Iw ≤ κwXw ∀w ∈W (4)

















Qstwcm ≥ βstc dstc ∀s∈ S, t∈ T, c∈ Ĉst (8)
As1w = Iw ∀w ∈W,s∈ S (9)

















Qs, t−τ−1wcm ∀w ∈W,s∈ S, t= τ + 2, ..., |T | (11)



















wcm ∀s∈ S (14)∑
c∈C
Yc ≥B0 +B1 (15)
bE(Dc)≤ Yc ≤ bE(Dc) + b
√
V ar(Dc)Z ∀c∈C (16)
Xw, Iw ∈Z+ ∀w ∈W (17)




w ∈Z+ ∀w ∈W,s∈ S, t∈ T (19)
Z ≥ 0 (20)
Yc ≥ 0 ∀c∈C (21)
B0, B1 ≥ 0. (22)
The first term of the objective function (3) minimizes the value of the maximum deviation
variable, which is used to determine premiums paid by the countries. Specifically, by minimizing
the maximum deviation, we minimize the amount of extra investment a country will make
beyond the costs associated with its expected demand. Note that the deviation is a dimensionless
variable, and is expected to take a small value. Therefore, we multiply the deviation objective
by a large weight λ (see §5.2.1). The second and third terms in (3) represent the sum of the fixed
costs associated with warehouses, and the cost associated with acquiring and holding inventory,
respectively. The last term in (3) is the expected emergency response costs associated with
transportation supplies and replenishing warehouses after a disaster occurs.
Constraints (4)–(12) are associated with the network design, while constraints (13)–(16) are
related to the cost allocation decisions. Constraints (4) ensure that the amount of inventory
to preposition at each opened warehouse does not exceed its capacity. Constraints (5) bound
the number of warehouses to locate in each country. Constraints (6) limit the amount of sup-
plies than can be shipped from a warehouse by the amount of available (undamaged) supplies.
Constraints (7) ensure that the targeted demands are fully met. Constraints (8) are imposed to
satisfy a preset proportion of the targeted demand at the first response level. Constraints (9) set
the amount of inventory at the beginning of the hurricane season. Constraints (10) control the
flow at each warehouse and for each period by considering the amount of undamaged supplies
at a warehouse at the beginning of the previous period, the amount of shipped supplies from the
warehouse during the previous period, and the replenishment amount arriving at the warehouse
at the beginning of the period. Constraints (11) set the replenishment amount arriving at a
warehouse in each period, which is equal to the total amount of used and damaged supplies
during the lead time. Constraints (12) set the replenishment to zero for the initial periods of
the hurricane season that are smaller than the lead time.
Constraints (13) and (14) determine the investment required to cover the disaster prepared-
ness and emergency response costs. Specifically, constraint (13) sets the preparedness budget,
which covers the expenses related to locating warehouses and acquiring and holding inventory.
Constraints (14) determine the emergency response budget, which must be sufficient to cover
the post-disaster transportation and replenishment costs for all scenarios. Constraint (15) guar-
antees that the country premiums cover the total initial investment. Constraints (16) bound
the country premiums, as explained in Section 4.1.7. Finally, constraints (17)–(22) define the
domains of the variables.
4.3. Properties of the Model
We now discuss some important properties of the proposed model.
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4.3.1. Effect of λ and the Restricted Model In our model, the network design and
the cost allocation decisions are linked through the deviation variable Z, which determines
country premiums. Minimizing Z in (3) implies minimizing the total initial investment, which
covers the disaster preparedness and the emergency response budgets (i.e., B0 + B1). Recall
that the emergency response budget must be sufficiently large to cover the response expenses
in each scenario (constraint (14)), while the last term of the objective function (3) minimizes
the expected value of the emergency response cost. Therefore, the objective function considers
both the worst-case value and the expected value of the emergency response cost, which will be
affected by the network design decisions.
Since the deviation value Z is much smaller than the other cost values minimized in the
objective function, we set a large value for the λ parameter. As λ increases, reducing the largest
emergency response costs becomes more important than minimizing the expected response cost.
In our numerical analyses, we choose a λ value that minimizes the total initial investments plus
the annual costs over a fixed payback period (see §5.2.1). Note that when λ is zero, the problem
ignores the cost allocation (premium setting) decisions. In other words, constraints (13)–(16)
are no longer binding. The resulting model then reduces to designing a prepositioning network
to minimize preparedness and expected emergency response costs, and ignores the fact that the
total initial investment must be shared fairly among the partners. We use this restricted model
to estimate an average cost associated with prepositioning and shipping one family kit in the
network (i.e., to set the value of parameter b).
4.3.2. Fairness of the Country Premiums Each country’s premium is set by consid-
ering the expectation and the standard deviation of its demand. Proposition 1 proves that the
deviation associated with each country is the same in the optimal solution.
Proposition 1 In any optimal solution of (3)–(22), the right-hand side of constraints (16) is
satisfied at equality, i.e., given the optimal value of the deviation variable Z, denoted by Z∗, each
country’s premium is equal to its estimated expected logistics cost, plus Z∗ times the estimated
standard deviation of its logistics cost.
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that Z∗ is the minimum value that Z can take,
and that one right-hand side of (16) is not satisfied at equality. Without loss of generality, let
c = 1 be such that Y ∗1 < bE(D1) + b
√
V ar(D1)Z
∗. Then, there exists a value x > 0 such that
Y ∗1 +x= bE(D1)+b
√
V ar(D1)Z
∗. Moreover, as Y ∗1 ≥ bE(D1) due to constraints (16), bE(D1)+
x ≤ bE(D1) + b
√
V ar(D1)Z
∗, and therefore x/b
√
V ar(D1) ≤ Z∗, since b
√
















These values of Ȳ ∗c , for c = 1, . . . , |C|, satisfy the left-hand side of (16). If we show that they
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also satisfy constraints (15), we would find a value smaller than Z∗ such that all constraints are

































































Y ∗c ≥B0 +B1,
(23)
there must exist a value (Z∗−∆)≤Z∗ such that all constraints are satisfied, which contradicts
our initial hypothesis that Z∗ was the minimal value.
4.3.3. The Minimum Required Amount of Inventory In the proposed network, the
total inventory on hold is sufficient to cover the full demand of a hurricane season, which is
represented by a scenario, possibly involving multiple hurricanes occurring at different periods.
However, the minimum inventory needed for a given scenario is not equal to the total demand of
that scenario because it depends on the timing on the hurricane events over the season, on their
demands, and on the lead times. We next calculate the minimum required amount of inventory
in the network to cover the needs that will occur throughout the season. We denote by Ωτ the
minimum required amount of inventory corresponding to a fixed replenishment lead time τ . In
each season, whenever a disaster occurs in a given period, we need to have enough inventory
to cover the associated demand. At the end of the period, a replenishment order is given for
the used supplies, and the orders arrive after the lead time. Therefore, in each period t, the
network inventory must include the available inventory needed to cover the sum of the demands
that occur in that period, plus the replenishment amount ordered and that will arrive after the
lead time, i.e., the sum of the demands that occurred between max{0, t− τ} and max{0, t− 1}.
Specifically, let ωsτ represent the minimum amount of inventory required to meet the needs in





















w, may be larger than Ωτ
due to i) the possibility of destroyed stocks at the affected warehouses, ii) the distribution of
the inventory within the network driven by the logistical connectivity and costs, and iii) the
coverage requirements (i.e., βstc ).
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4.3.4. The Benefits of Collaboration To evaluate and measure the benefits of a collab-
orative network, we compare the solutions obtained from our collaborative prepositioning model
with a benchmark solution in which each country implements an independent prepositioning
strategy by only considering its own risks. To this end, we generate a scenario set exclusive to
each country and compute the minimum required amount of inventory for each country, denoted













Proposition 2 The minimum required amount of inventory needed in the collaborative net-






Proof. Let ω̄s,cτ be the minimum amount of inventory needed in country c in period t in a given
































































We first present test instances generated from real data related to the Caribbean network.
This will be followed by the results of our numerical analyses. We calculate the benefits of
collaboration and the extent of risk pooling achieved in the network.
5.1. The Caribbean Network Data Set
There appears to exist no available data set for multi-country humanitarian networks. The
collaborative network considered in this study includes 20 CARICOM countries. We collected
data from various publicly available sources, and also from CDEMA and IFRC. Since the avail-
able raw data were unstructured and fragmented, we applied a systematic approach to develop
realistic estimates for each parameter of our model, which we now describe.
5.1.1. Hurricane Scenarios Each scenario corresponds to a season during which multiple
hurricanes may occur. We developed hurricane scenarios based on historical data by validating
and merging the information contained in three databases: the Emergency Events Database
(EM-DAT) (EM-DAT, 2018), the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
database, known as HURDAT (NOAA, 2018), and a local database, known as the Caribbean
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Hurricane Network (CHN) (CHN, 2018). We examined historical hurricane tracks from these
sources focusing on a period between 1950 and 2017, and we generated a database containing the
timing of each storm, the set of countries on the storm track, the strength of the storm affecting
each country, and the affected population in each country. This yielded 188 events spread over 62
seasons. No two seasons are identical in terms of the number, severity and timing of events and
the countries affected. For each of the 62 seasons, we generated five scenarios having the same
hurricane tracks and timing, but different severities and demands. In particular, to generate
scenario demands, we first assigned a severity category to the countries on each track, according
to the percentage of past events affecting a country at different strengths. We classified a storm
having a category less than or equal to 2 as mild (M), a storm of category 3 as strong (S),
and those with larger categories as very strong (VS). Based on the assigned category of the
storm and the largest percentage of affected population in that country over the years, which
we obtained from historical data, we generated an estimate of the affected number of people
in each country. We then divided the affected population values by five, which is the average
family size, to obtain the targeted demand values. Recall that in our insurance framework a
maximum coverage limit (MCL) specifies the maximum amount that can be covered for each
country per hurricane event. Therefore, if the number of family kits generated by our procedure
is larger than the prespecified MCL value, we accept the MCL value as the targeted demand. In
our experiments, MCL is set to 5,000, 8,000 and 12,000. Finally, based on the generated demand
values, we calculated the expected value and the variance of the demand for each country. As
a result, we obtained 310 different and equiprobable scenarios. We provide more details about
data processing and scenario generation in Appendix A.
5.1.2. The Extreme Scenarios The required initial investment for establishing the col-
laborative network can be quite large if a full coverage against all possible events is envisaged.
It is therefore worthwhile to evaluate the implications of disregarding some of the rare and
extreme scenarios on network design decisions and costs. As widely discussed in the literature,
systems are not typically designed for either the average case nor for the most extreme condi-
tions (Daskin et al., 1997). A variety of methods are used to design networks under uncertainty
while addressing the effects of worst-case scenarios endogenously, including chance-constrained
programming, risk-averse models, and robust models (see Snyder (2006) for a review). In this
study, we use a simple approach, in which we define a restricted scenario set by removing some
extreme scenarios before solving the model, where extreme scenarios are specified based on the
minimum amount of inventory required to meet the needs of that scenario (i.e., ωsτ value). That
is, we use the ωsτ value as a proxy for measuring the implications of including a scenario in
our data set. Then, given a scenario set S and the ωsτ values for all scenarios, we remove a
subset of worst scenarios with the largest ωsτ values and obtain the restricted scenario set Sq.
More specifically, q represents the percentage of the worst scenarios, measured in terms of the
minimum amount of inventory required to meet the need of a scenario (ωsτ ), to be removed from
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S. To illustrate, in our numerical experiments, we generate |S| = 310 equiprobable scenarios
based on historical data, and consider instances with q= 5, which disregards bq|S|c = 15 worst
scenario in terms of ωsτ , and instances with q= 10, which eliminates bq|S|c = 31 scenarios.
We denote by Ωqτ the minimum required inventory in the collaborative network for a given
value of q, and by Ω̃qc,τ the minimum required amount of inventory for a given country c
if the country applies an independent prepositioning strategy based on the scenario set Sq.
As expected, removing extreme scenarios decreases the required minimum amount of inven-
tory needed. In our numerical analyses, we evaluate the benefits of collaboration for different
restricted scenario sets.
Three parameters affect the demand distributions and the minimum inventory levels: MCL, q
and τ . The MCL cuts some large demand values, and hence may affect the expected value and
variance of the demand for some countries. The parameter q affects demand distribution since
we remove some extreme scenarios from consideration. Note that changing the MCL value only
affects size of demands while keeping the number of scenarios fixed, and increasing q decreases
the number of scenarios in our data set. The lead time parameter τ directly affects the ωsτ value
as shown in (24). We consider different combinations of MCL, q and τ in our analyses.
5.1.3. Relief Supplies Family kits are stored and distributed in the network. The speci-
fications of the items in a family kit, presented in Table 8 of Appendix B, were obtained from
IFRC Panama, which operates in our region of interest. A family kit costs approximately USD
147.5, weighs 41 kilograms and has a volume of 0.14 cubic meters. We assume that a pallet
holds 20 kits, and a standard 20-foot container can hold 200 kits. We add insurance costs and
handling costs for each family kit purchased, estimated on hourly country-specific labor cost.
The cost of holding one unit of a purchased item is equal to the cost of holding items in the
warehouse, plus the opportunity capital cost. The unit inventory holding cost is equal to 6% of
the purchase cost.
5.1.4. Candidate Warehouses There are fundamental differences among the profiles of
the CARICOM countries in terms of their population, disaster risk and logistical connectiv-
ity. We chose candidate warehouse locations among the 20 CARICOM countries based on an
exploratory study. Specifically, we asked CDEMA to evaluate each country as a potential ware-
house location by considering three attributes: i) risk exposure, ii) logistical infrastructure and
connectivity, and iii) political stability and safety. Publicly available global indices such as the
INFORM 2018 Risk Index (INFORM, 2018), the Logistics Performance Index (World Bank,
2018), and the Worldwide Governance Index (World Bank, 2017) were used by CDEMA to score
the countries. Each country’s performance was classified as very poor, below average, average
and above average for each attribute. When a country’s performance was lower than average in
at least one attribute or there was no index data about the country, then that country was elim-
inated from the list of potential warehouse locations. In the end, 10 countries were considered
as candidates. In Table 1, we present data related to the candidate warehouse locations.
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We assume that a number of 10,000 square feet warehouses can be rented in these candidate
locations, each capable of storing 600 pallets and hence 12,000 family kits. We set the maximum
number of warehouses to locate in each location at a large value and we let the model determine
the optimal number of warehouses. The fixed cost of locating a warehouse for the first year in
a country was estimated by considering the annual costs of renting the facility and hiring staff,
and also the purchasing cost of one forklift. The rental cost was calculated for each country
based on publicly available rent indices, and considering DMA as a benchmark country, for
which the warehouse rental costs were obtained from the Dominican Red Cross. We assumed the
presence of one permanent worker at each warehouse. We further assumed that additional staff
and equipment could be temporarily obtained; the associated costs were considered as variable
costs, proportional to the amount of inventory held, and incorporated into the holding cost.
We added a 1% insurance charge to the total fixed costs to cover expenses related to possible
damages.
The base case fixed costs are also listed in Table 1. Additionally, in our numerical experiments,
we explored solutions that could be obtained by having the same fixed cost across all candidate
locations. This could be possible if the hosting governments subsidized the cost of warehousing,
as was done in previous similar initiatives in the region (Balletto and Wertheimer, 2010). In this
case, we assigned the average fixed cost value to each candidate warehouse. We also considered
a setting in which the current subregional focal points of CDEMA have smaller fixed costs than
all other locations, such as half of the network average.
Table 1 Data related to the candidate warehouse locations
Candidate Fixed Average Average unit Number Mild Strong Very Strong
location cost transit time transit cost of events events events events
(USD) (days) (USD) (%) (%) (%)
Air Sea Air Sea
Antigua and Barbuda 209,067 1 4.86 99.85 5.52 26 73 15 12
Bahamas 288,131 1 5.97 99.10 12.58 62 79 11 10
Belize 104,452 1 6.63 98.25 12.99 22 68 0 32
Barbados 149,741 1 4.93 77.37 6.26 22 91 9 0
Dominica 96,754 1 4.84 133.98 9.03 28 82 4 14
Grenada 110,987 1 4.89 79.19 9.11 16 81 13 6
Guyana 105,020 1 5.64 99.72 6.79 0 0 0 0
Jamaica 119,307 1 5.53 109.28 5.77 26 77 8 15
Suriname 92,899 1 5.85 99.15 6.32 0 0 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 139,930 1 5.08 99.69 6.27 13 85 15 0
5.1.5. Sea Transportation We collected data from various publicly available sources to
estimate sea transportation times and costs. The IFRC Panama uses sea transportation to
serve the Caribbean region. Based on their data, it takes two to 10 days to arrange and ship
items. However, both IFRC and CDEMA agree that it is possible to use sea transportation
more effectively, for example by having dedicated ships. Many shipping lines carry passengers
and cargo among the islands, which can be effectively used after a hurricane. To estimate
sea transportation times, we first identified the major sea ports in each of the 20 CARICOM
countries. We then used Internet sources (e.g., Sea Distances (2019)) to calculate the distance
and travel time between each port pair by assuming a speed of 20 knots. We added a three-day
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allowance to the transportation times to account for handling. We conducted tests for a larger
four-day allowance. Since sea transportation takes more than three days, it can only be used to
serve countries during the slower response phase in our network. Furthermore, if a warehouse
location is hit by a disaster, we assume that it cannot serve other countries by sea for that
disaster due to possible damages and access problems. To estimate sea transportation costs, we
used the container cargo prices between country pairs from World Freight Rates (2019). We
also added a fixed cost per container to cover additional expenses such as port charges and
documentation. This cost is assumed to be USD 80 from the IFRC data, based on its pre-agreed
transportation providers in the Caribbean. We then extracted raw data from Maritime Routes in
the Greater Caribbean (2019) and identified the number of shipping lines between each country
pair. To reflect the connectivity of the countries, we multiplied these base costs by 1.5 whenever
there was no shipping line operating between two countries, and by 0.98, 0.975, 0.97 and 0.95,
if there were three, four, five or more lines, respectively. Finally, for each originating country we
added cargo handling costs on the basis of local labor costs.
5.1.6. Air Transportation Air transportation costs were estimated based on cargo price
data obtained from the IFRC, Caribbean Airlines and Cayman Airways. The IFRC has agree-
ments with cargo companies, which provide IFRC a fixed cargo rate every year for shipping
supplies from Panama to the Caribbean countries. Whereas several airlines operate in the region,
the two airlines we considered publish their cargo rates in their webpages. Hence, we computed
the average price of shipping a kilogram of cargo for each origin and destination pair. Further-
more, when two countries were not connected by any airline, we increased the price by 5% since
then private planes must be used, while we reduced the unit price by 2.5% when there were
multiple airlines serving the same link. Similar to sea transportation, we added handling charges
per kit based on country-specific labor costs, as well as a fixed cost to account for port charges,
which was estimated to be USD 0.17 per kilogram from the IFRC data. Air transportation is the
only mode that can be used to meet the coverage requirements at the first response time level.
However, if a warehouse location is affected by a disaster, we prevent the affected warehouse
from serving other countries by air in the first three days after the disaster. Furthermore, if the
amount of demand to be covered at the first response level corresponds to a partially loaded
plane, we increase the amount to be covered at this level to a multiple of a plane capacity, to
encourage full shipments by plane.
5.1.7. Other Parameters In the base case, the lead time τ was set at two months (four
periods), which was estimated based on IFRC’s average replenishment time in the Panama
warehouse. In our analyses, we explored the effects of a shorter lead time period, such as one
month, to understand the potential effects of a faster procurement strategy on our collaborative
prepositioning network.
The percentage of damaged supplies was estimated according to the hurricane categories. We
considered three settings with respect to the αstw parameter. In the base case, supplies are lost
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only due to destructive effects of strong hurricanes. Specifically, we assumed that 20% supplies
are lost if the hurricane category is S, and 50% are lost if the category is VS. We also considered
instances in which no supplies are destroyed in any event. Finally, we considered instances in
which 20%, 50% and 100% of the available inventory is lost in hurricanes with M, S and VS
categories, respectively. We set the minimum percentage of supplies to be satisfied within the
first three days (the βstc parameter) as 10% in our base case. We explored the effects of increasing
response time requirements by setting this parameter to 30%.
To summarize, we used three levels of MCL and q, and two levels of τ in the base case,
which leads to 18 base case instances. For each of these instances, we conducted experiments
by modifying the other parameters. Specifically, we tested for different levels of fixed costs, sea
transportation times, damaged supplies percentages, and response requirements. In total, we
used 126 instances to test our methodology.
5.1.8. Model Implementation We coded our model by using Java Concert Technology
and we used CPLEX 12.7 to obtain solutions on a 64-bit Windows Server with two 2.0 GHz
Intel Xeon CPU’s and 32 GB RAM. We set a one-hour time limit for each instance. Some
instances were solved within a few minutes, while others could not be solved to optimality





wcm ≤ Iw to help CPLEX set the values of the Q variables. We
also set the associated values of the Q variables equal to zero, when i) a country does not have
a demand in a given scenario and time period, ii) a country’s demand cannot be covered by a
candidate warehouse by any transportation mode, or iii) a candidate warehouse is out of service
due to effects of a disaster. We solved the restricted model to estimate the value of parameter b
by assuming that the second-stage variables R, A and Q can be continuous. The effect of this
relaxation on the b value is negligible.
5.2. Results and Discussion
Here we present and discuss the results of our numerical analyses.
5.2.1. Setting a λ Value The λ value in (3) affects the tradeoff between the amount
of initial investment required to establish the collaborative network and the expected annual
costs, which includes expected replenishment and transportation costs as well as fixed costs
(i.e., renting, holding, staff, and insurance). Specifically, setting λ to a small value could yield
a network with the lowest expected annual costs, but this choice may require large initial
investments. By incurring smaller yearly total costs, the large initial investment can be recovered
quickly. In contrast, by setting λ to a large value, the minimization of the initial investment
needed to set up the network is prioritized, and the total yearly costs are higher. To identify
the best λ value, we considered a fixed payback period for the network, and we calculated an
annual equivalent value for the sum of the initial investments and the expected annual costs
over this period. Specifically, we considered three alternative payback periods, of five, 10 and
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15 years, and calculated annualized total investments by assuming three interest rates equal
to 3%, 4% and 5%. We ran tests on our 126 instances, setting b = 196.74 (value obtained by
solving the 126 instances on a restricted model and averaging the solution values), for seven
different values of λ, ranging between 104 and 1010. By fixing the payback period, the interest
rate, and the MCL value, we calculated an average value over different q values for the sum
of the annualized initial investments and expected annual costs for each value of λ. According
to these results, if the desirable payback period is short, it is better to give more weight to
minimizing the country investments, and as the payback period increases it becomes preferable
to have a smaller value of λ and build a network that engenders smaller costs each year. While
we observed these trends in individual solutions, we found λ= 108 to be the best choice since
it yields the minimum values on most instances.
5.2.2. Collaborative Network Analysis: Identifying the Strong Candidate Loca-
tions We first analyzed the optimal solutions of our 126 instances and identified the most
desirable countries where to locate warehouses. Specifically, we counted the number of times a
country was selected as a warehouse location under different settings. Each setting involves 18
instances obtained by fixing a parameter and considering different combinations of MCL, q and
τ values; the remaining parameters are assigned to their base case value. In each setting, if a
country belongs to the top three selected locations over the 18 instances, we assigned a score of
2 to that country, while if it is among the next three locations its score is 1 (see Table 2).
Table 2 Scores of the candidate warehouse locations (the best six locations are shown in boldface)
Instances
Candidate Base No Higher Larger Increased Smaller Identical Sum
location case damage damage sea fast focal points fixed of
transit time coverage fixed cost cost scores
Antigua 2 2
Bahamas 1 1 2 4
Belize 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 12
Barbados 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 13
Dominica 1 2 1 2 1 7
Grenada 1 1 2 1 1 6
Guyana 2 2 2 1 7
Jamaica 1 1 1 3
Suriname 2 2 2 2 2 10
Trinidad and Tobago 1 2 1 4
The candidate warehouse location with the largest total score is BRB, which is relatively
expensive in terms of fixed costs; however, it has not yet been hit by a VS event, and has the
lowest air transportation costs, as well as low sea transportation costs (Table 2). The next most
popular candidate is BLZ, which has been affected by VS events, but is advantageous in terms of
fixed costs and air transportation costs. SUR and GUY are the third and fourth best candidates.
They are never affected by hurricanes and have low fixed location costs. We also considered
DMA and GRD among the strong candidates. Note that DMA and GRD have been affected
by VS events, but they are good candidates due to their logistical connectivity and costs. In
particular, DMA has relatively low fixed costs and high air and sea transportation costs, but a
very good sea connectivity. Therefore, when other less expensive countries become less connected
by sea due to higher sea transportation times, DMA becomes a preferred location. GRD is a
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bit more expensive in terms of fixed costs, but is cheap for air transportation. Moreover, like
DMA, it has a good sea connectivity, therefore it is among the best locations when considering
higher sailing times. Note that three of the CDEMA subregional focal points, ATG, JAM and
TTO, do not have high scores. These locations are chosen mainly when their fixed costs are
decreased (Table 2). JAM is the cheapest location for sea transportation and can serve HTI by
sea. For this reason, it is among the best six locations when higher sea transportation times are
considered. However, JAM has been affected by a number of VS hurricanes, which makes it a
poor warehouse location. Since there are already strong candidates in the Eastern Caribbean
that are geographically close to ATG and TTO, such as BRB, DMA, GUY and SUR, and
BLZ in the Western Caribbean that is geographically close to JAM, we do not consider these
countries among the strong candidates.
5.2.3. The Recommended Collaborative Prepositioning Network Having identified
the best six candidate countries (BRB, BLZ, SUR, GUY, DMA, and GRD), we performed
additional tests to design the collaborative prepositioning network. We considered different
values of MCL and q and set other parameters to their base case values, and we applied our
model by only considering CDEMA’s current four subregional focal points, which are ATG,
BRB, JAM and TTO. Note that in reality CDEMA has fixed service regions as shown in Figure
1, while in our problem we do not force single sourcing constraints, since i) we assume that
warehouses can be affected by a disaster and supplies may be lost, which would prevent a
warehouse from serving its assigned countries, and ii) risk pooling benefits may decrease in the
region when service regions are fixed. The results for different sets of candidate locations are
presented in Table 3.
Table 3 Description of the solutions obtained by solving our model (Recommended prepositioning network)
and by fixing the focal points (Optimized current prepositioning network)
Instance
q = 0 q = 5 q = 10
MCL = 12,000 MCL = 8,000 MCL = 12,000 MCL = 8,000 MCL = 12,000 MCL = 8,000
Recommended prepositioning network
Warehouse locations(#) BLZ(3), BRB(1), DMA(2), BLZ(2), BRB(1), DMA(1), BLZ(1), DMA(1), GRD(2), BLZ(1), BRB(1), DMA(1), DMA(1), GRD(1), GUY(2), BLZ(1), BRB(1), GUY(2),
GRD(1), SUR(3) GRD(1), SUR(3) GUY(2) GUY(2) SUR(2) SUR(1)
Deviation (Z) 0.167 0.161 0.150 0.139 0.135 0.123
Total inventory 116,927 89,275 69,763 51,559 61,123 46,543
Maximum Premium 6,413,974 4,236,715 5,641,772 3,621,375 4,587,978 3,010,144
Average premium 2,283,631 1,739,541 1,898,231 1,414,421 1,582,684 1,178,457
Tot required investment 41,105,350 31,311,733 34,168,161 25,459,586 28,488,312 21,212,226
Expected emergency 5,737,162 4,626,316 5,296,909 4,306,228 4,980,248 4,007,110
response cost
Optimized current prepositioning network
Warehouse locations(#) ATG(3), BRB(1), JAM(2), ATG(2), BRB(1), JAM(1), ATG(1), BRB(1), TTO(4) BRB(2), JAM(1), TTO(1)
TTO(1) TTO(1)
Deviation (Z) 0.153 0.142 0.137 0.126
Total inventory Infeasible Infeasible 75,620 54,450 61,745 47,800
Maximum Premium 5,730,025 3,676,601 4,639,641 3,069,609
Average premium 1,929,377 1,438,435 1,601,497 1,205,019
Tot required investment 34,728,781 25,891,829 28,826,942 21,690,334
Expected emergency 5,236,083 4,284,502 4,888,821 3,957,826
response cost
According to the results, when MCL = 12,000 and q = 0, 10 warehouses are located in five
countries, which hold a total of 116,927 kits. When q = 5, six warehouses are needed, and the
total inventory to cover all scenarios is 40% smaller, which is 69,763 units. Furthermore, a
17% decrease in average country premiums is observed, and the country premiums are equal or
smaller for every country in the recommended prepositioning network. If we further eliminate
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scenarios with large minimum required inventory and set q = 10, six warehouses are located in
four countries. However, the change in inventory and costs are not that dramatic in this case
compared with eliminating the worst 5% from the base scenario set. We observe this trend when
MCL = 8,000; that is, a large reduction of 42% in inventory is obtained if 5% of the worst
scenarios are ignored when making prepositioning decisions. Given the significant saving in the
amount of inventory and corresponding investments, it is reasonable to design the collaborative
prepositioning network based on q = 5, which can cover 95% of the scenarios generated from
historical data. Therefore, for the base case with MCL = 12,000, we recommend operating six
warehouses in four countries.
When we ran the model by fixing CDEMA’s current locations, we could not find a feasible
solution in settings with q= 0. This is because there are some hurricane seasons in which all of
the candidate warehouse locations are affected simultaneously by a hurricane. Since an affected
warehouse is out of service for the first three days after a hurricane, no feasible solution exists.
When q = 5 or 10, the current warehouse locations yield feasible solutions. However, the total
amount of inventory and the required investment are larger compared with the recommended
collaborative prepositioning network. Note that the solutions obtained by solving our model by
fixing CDEMA’s current locations do not correspond to the real current setting of CDEMA’s
network. Indeed, they are obtained by relaxing CDEMA’s fixed subregions, which would impose
that each country can be served from exactly one warehouse, making the model always infeasible.
Table 3 provides the optimized solutions of the current network, for different MCL and q values.
Table 4 Difference between the optimized current and recommended prepositioning network
Difference between
q MCL total total maximum average
investment inventory premium premium
Base case
5
12,000 560,621 5,857 88,254 31,146
8,000 432,243 2,891 55,226 24,014
10
12,000 338,630 622 51,664 18,813
8,000 478,108 1,257 59,464 26,562
Higher damage
5
12,000 1,855,585 17,710 292,108 103,088
8,000 1,468,251 12,320 187,593 81,570
10
12,000 854,897 5,603 130,429 47,494
8,000 888,869 4,029 110,553 49,382
Table 4 shows the differences between the solution of the optimized current and of the sug-
gested prepositioning network, for different values of MCL and q, and for two sets of instances.
For the base case instances, when q = 5 and MCL = 12,000, the optimized current network
requires a total investment of UDS 560,621 larger than the suggested network and 5,857 more
items. This leads to larger maximum and average premiums. These differences become more
important when considering the set of instances with a higher damage level, i.e. those where
more supplies are lost in case a warehouse is affected. When q= 5 and MCL = 12,000, the opti-
mized current network requires the storage of 17,710 more items than the suggested network
to cover all the demand, and a total investment of almost USD 1.9 million more. Considering
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these numbers we believe that CDEMA could decide to keep its current focal points and use
our model to optimize the inventory. However, if there is a risk of higher damages, since some
of the current subregional focal points, such as JAM, are often hit and have a higher degree of
exposure, we suggest some changes in the current warehouse locations.
Table 5 Investment and the usage of the network with MCL = 12,000 and when allowing a complete
demand coverage, by setting MCL = ∞
Distribution of the scenarios as a function of
the average interval of used inventory (%)*
q MCL Tot required # opened Total Maximum Average [0, 10] ]10, 20] ]20, 30] ]30, 40] ]40, 50] ]50, 80] ]80, 100] ]100, ∞[
investment facilities inventory Premium Premium
0
12,000 41,105,350 10 116,927 6,413,974 2,283,631 19.35 21.29 18.39 14.19 11.61 9.68 4.52 0.97
∞ 826,022,649 188 2,245,701 606,679,168 45,890,147 67.42 11.94 6.45 2.90 5.81 3.87 0.65 0.97
5
12,000 34,168,161 6 69,763 5,641,772 1,898,231 13.22 13.90 11.53 10.85 11.86 26.78 6.44 5.42
∞ 423,298,682 92 1,098,848 285,584,130 23,516,593 58.64 12.20 8.81 3.73 3.73 5.76 5.76 1.36
10
12,000 28,488,312 6 61,123 4,587,978 1,582,684 12.19 11.83 12.90 10.75 8.96 30.11 10.04 3.23
∞ 379,039,292 75 888,018 232,720,182 21,057,738 58.78 10.04 11.47 5.73 2.15 7.89 2.15 1.79
* For example, for q = 0 and MCL =∞, 67.42% of all scenarios use at most 10% of the total inventory, equal to 2,245,701 family kits. For q = 5 and MCL =
12,000, 26.78% of all scenarios use between 50% and 80% of the total inventory, equal to 69,763 family kits.
Table 5 compares the solutions with MCL = 12,000 and without a maximum coverage limit
(MCL =∞) in terms of the total required investment, number of open warehouse facilities,
total inventory, average and maximum premiums, and utilization of the inventory for different
q values. As observed from this table, if MCL is unbounded, the required inventory, the number
of facilities and the total investment become unaffordable. Moreover, the stock utilization drops
significantly, which implies that most of the family kits would sit in the warehouse for several
years before being used. Note that in more than 58% of the scenarios corresponding to potential
hurricane seasons, the average percentage of used stocks is less than 10%, and this is for all
q values. When designing the network with q = 0 and MCL = 12,000 units, we note that the
average percentage of used stock is less than 10% for less than 20% of the scenarios, whereas this
is the case for less than approximately 13% of the scenarios when q = 5 and q = 10. Thus, the
utilized capacity increases significantly when imposing a maximum coverage limit. The results
presented in Table 5 show that designing a prepositioning network without imposing a maximum
coverage limit (MCL =∞) would lead to unreasonable investments and important inefficiencies,
i.e., to several mostly unused facilities, low stock utilization rate, deterioration risks, excess
storage capacities and costs. They also show that using q = 5 and MCL = 12,000 units yields
interesting solutions in terms of investment and inventory utilization, while providing a good
coverage.
In the recommended network, the affected countries are served by warehouses located in
different countries under different scenarios. Table 6 shows the average percentage of demand
satisfied by each warehouse location and mode per affected country. It identifies the primary
hubs and the transportation modes used to serve each affected country, when it is served from
at least two different locations by sea and by air in different scenarios. For both air and sea, the
demand of a country in a single event is usually served from the same warehouse. Therefore, our
results do not suggest fixing service regions a priori as in CDEMA’s current system. However, for
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Figure 3 Country premiums, expected demands and standard deviations of demands
each approaching event, the affected countries can be assigned to the most logistically convenient
warehouses. Moreover, air and sea connectivity can be improved on the most frequently used
links in order to fully benefit from the collaborative prepositioning network.
Table 6 Average percentage of demand served from the warehouses via air and sea
Belize Dominica Grenada Guyana
Air Sea Air Sea Air Sea Air Sea
AIA 3.05 50.96 41.26 1.95 2.78
ATG 0.86 33.40 21.02 24.42 20.31
BHS 0.51 69.80 9.12 12.03 8.39 0.15
BLZ 0.82 39.89 2.38
BMU 38.19 49.18 12.63
BRB 3.70 49.33 12.82 23.74 2.41 8.00
BVI 0.87 0.34 48.34 21.56 17.14 11.75
CYM 0.54 4.31 56.93 17.71 18.42 2.09
DMA 0.33 15.74 15.82 0.82 5.85
GRD 13.57 4.37 5.53 3.96
GUY
HTI 0.41 0.09 35.55 8.14 27.04 1.48 27.29
JAM 1.52 1.27 10.55 8.84 49.88 0.45 27.48
KNA 1.38 20.53 29.62 31.79 16.67
LCA 2.80 30.62 15.65 39.64 0.38 10.90
MST 2.21 87.47 2.93 4.09 3.30
SUR
TCA 1.10 16.18 36.69 21.14 4.37 20.52
TTO 6.01 30.82 3.37 15.56 2.70 41.54
VCT 10.08 33.13 21.93 26.78 1.98 6.10
[0,5] (5,10] (10,20] (20,30] (30,50] (50,100]
The total investment required to establish the recommended collaborative network is about
USD 34.2 million. The country premiums needed to cover this investment range between USD
138,139 and USD 5,641,772. Figure 3 shows the premium of each country, as well as the expected
value and the standard deviation of the demand. As indicated by these graphs, the premiums
reflect the countries’ average demands as well as their standard deviations. The optimal Z
value is 0.15, which is the same for all countries as shown by Proposition 1. Interestingly, a
similar range of premiums is reported for the CCRIF policies, as discussed in §3.2. Similarly
to the CCRIF experience, highly vulnerable countries such as HTI, may not have sufficient
financial resources to pay the annual premiums and may need external donors to sustain their
membership.
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5.2.4. Observations and Insights We present our observations related to the effects of
the model parameters on the network design decisions and costs, based on the solutions of the
126 test instances, and also on some experiments performed on the proposed network.
• Lead time. In the proposed network, the lead time τ is set to two months, based on the
IFRC current replenishment times. We observe that decreasing the lead time to one month could
make a significant impact on the structure of the recommended solution. Specifically, for q = 5
and MCL = 12,000, although the number of warehouses to locate would be the same, the total
network inventory would decrease by 8% and the total required country investment would go
down by 2.9%. We observe similar trends in the solutions of the 126 test instances. Specifically,
the inventory held in the network is on average 6.83% larger in instances with longer lead
times, which corresponds to 1.75% larger investments. Furthermore, the location and number
of facilities is affected by the lead time in 46% of the instances. These results suggest that the
replenishment lead time is a critical parameter, which could help reduce the inventory held in
the collaborative network. Therefore, it would be beneficial to have arrangements in place to
achieve a faster replenishment during the hurricane season. This could be possible by i) making
framework agreements with the suppliers to expedite shipments, and ii) having additional stocks
in close hubs such as the UNHRD depot located in Panama. The cost savings achieved by the
reduced lead time could be used to finance these strategies.
• Sea connectivity. In the base case, we set sea transportation times by adding a three-day
delay to the pure sea transportation times to account for handling. When this delay becomes
longer, some country pairs lose connectivity by sea. Since sea shipments are much cheaper than
air shipments, reduced sea connectivity can have a major effect on the network and costs. In the
proposed network, decreased sea connectivity primarily affects the warehouse in GUY, which
is a critical location for serving HTI, JAM, TCA and TTO (see Table 6). If sea transportation
times are increased by one day, GUY cannot cover three of these countries within one week.
Therefore, the warehouses in GUY are shifted to other locations. However, this change could
lead to significant respective increases of 7.56% and 5.04% in the expected transportation costs
and in the emergency response budget. Therefore, in our recommended propositioning network,
it would be useful to make arrangements to maintain and improve the sea connectivity of GUY.
We also observe the criticality of sea connectivity in the results of other test instances. Pri-
marily, the elongated sea trips consistently lead to a larger difference between the minimum
inventory required in the network (Ωqτ ) and the optimal amount of inventory (I
∗) more than
any other parameter. Specifically, over all instances with q = 5, increased sea transportation
times lead to a 2.3% larger inventory compared with the minimum required amount, which cor-
responds to 1,180 units on average. In many instances, the number and locations of warehouses
are also affected. Because of the relative advantage of sea transportation, the model chooses to
store additional inventory rather than relying on air shipments. Our discussions with CDEMA
and IFRC also validated the criticality of improving sea transportation in the region. Acquiring
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and positioning dedicated ships for moving relief supplies among the islands is one of the options
considered, which would highly enhance the network’s effectiveness.
• Coverage requirements. Increasing the coverage requirements in the first three days from
10% to 30% implies using more air shipments to serve the affected locations. For the proposed
network, the expected transportation costs increase by 71.55%, compared with the base case.
The warehouse locations are not very sensitive to faster response requirements; indeed, only the
capacities of the existing locations are changed because more supplies are stored in locations
that are cheaper for air transportation. Therefore, to economically improve the response times
in the network, it would be beneficial to negotiate better rates with air transportation providers,
especially for the most frequently used links shown in Table 6.
• Destroyed warehouses and supplies. When the risk of losing supplies in the warehouses
located in hurricane-prone countries increases, more warehouses are located in GUY and SUR,
which have not previously been hit by any hurricane. Whereas the total amount of inventory held
in the network is not significantly affected (only 1.53% larger), since the network becomes more
centralized, the expected transportation cost increases by 10.31%, and the emergency response
budget goes up by 2.83%. These results highlight the importance of adequately evaluating the
risks associated with losing supplies when determining the warehouse locations.
We stress that the solutions are generally more sensitive to changes in the parameters as q
increases. When q = 0, the network holds excess inventory in order to cover all scenarios, and
therefore, small changes in parameter values do not considerably affect warehouse locations and
the amounts of prepositioned inventory.
5.2.5. Analysis of Collaboration Benefits The collaborative prepositioning network
achieves risk pooling benefits by centralizing inventory, which is shown in Proposition 2 for
q = 0. To measure this benefit for any value of q, we propose the following performance metric
φ, which calculates the savings gained by using joint prepositioned stocks, as opposed to each








This metric can be calculated based on scenarios and without solving our optimization model.
Accordingly, given a set of scenarios Sq, if the minimum inventory required in the collaborative
network is close to the sum of inventories that countries would hold independently, then φ takes
a small value, which indicates that the collaboration benefits are small. Conversely, when there
is a large gap between the minimum amount of the joint stocks and the sum of the independent
stocks, then φ becomes larger, reflecting higher benefits from collaboration.
For MCL = 12,000 and τ = 4, Table 7 shows the values of φ computed for different values
of q between 0 and 50. We obtain similar values and trends for the other MCL and τ values.
When q= 0, φ is about 0.56, which means that the total inventory needed from all countries if
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each of them would store independently, is more than twice the amount that would be needed in
our collaborative prepositioning network to cover all disasters. Interestingly, this ratio is aligned
with what CCRIF reports for the country premiums, as discussed in §3.2. The value of φ tends
to increase with q. The largest jump occurs when q increases from 0 to 5. This justifies our
choice of designing a collaborative network with q = 5, which yields a large φ value, equal to
more than 0.70 in all settings, and ensures a good service level.
Table 7 φ values for different q values, MCL = 12,000 and τ = 4
q 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
φ 0.56 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83
These results encourage us to develop extensions of our multi-country collaboration mecha-
nism to other parts of the world, for example, to South-East Asia and Oceania, which are often
hit by hurricanes and where risk pooling benefits may be achieved by keeping joint emergency
stocks. Existing regional disaster response mechanisms in these regions may facilitate the devel-
opment and implementation of a collaborative prepositioning strategy. For instance, national
agencies of the IFRC, which operate worldwide, could implement collaborative prepositioning
solutions to generate risk pooling benefits in their respective regions.
6. Conclusions
To close this paper, we summarize the main contributions of our study and we point to new
avenues of research.
6.1. Summary of our Scientific Contributions
We have proposed a new collaborative prepositioning network design strategy to improve
regional disaster management capacity in the Caribbean. We believe our study is the first ever to
develop a systematic method for collaborative propositioning in a multi-country setting. Specif-
ically, given a set of countries frequently affected by hurricanes, we determine the locations
and amounts of joint stocks to be kept in the network so that the affected countries can be
served quickly after a hurricane. Since different subsets of countries are affected by each event,
risk pooling benefits can be achieved by keeping joint stocks. In order to sustain the proposed
multi-country horizontal coordination mechanism, the required investments must be allocated
fairly among the partner countries. We have developed a model inspired by insurance theory to
allocate these costs among the partners in such a way that the country premiums are related
to the costs associated with the expected value and the variance of their demand.
We have constructed a realistic data set to test and solve our model. We have conducted
extensive numerical analyses to derive insights in order to support implementation. Our results
demonstrate that important risk pooling benefits can be achieved by implementing a collab-
orative mechanism among the Caribbean countries affected by hurricanes. The benefits from
collaboration increase significantly if the warehouse replenishment lead time during a hurricane
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season can be decreased and if regional logistical connectivity can be improved. The Caribbean
setting constitutes an ideal example to illustrate the proposed collaborative approach since
the CARICOM countries are connected to each other through economic, social and cultural
ties. Furthermore, there exist established institutions such as CDEMA and CCRIF, which can
support establishing and operating a collaborative prepositioning network in this region.
6.2. New Avenues of Research
Several avenues of research can be envisaged. In this study, we have concentrated on the
Caribbean because it is one of the most hurricane-prone region in the world and we had a close
collaboration with CDEMA and the IFRC. Extensions of the proposed multi-country horizontal
collaboration mechanism to other parts of the world are possible. For instance, the proposed
methodology can be adopted to South-East Asia and Oceania, which are often hit by hurricanes.
Some of our methodology can also be adapted to regions that are frequently affected by earth-
quakes. While CDEMA, which facilitates the collaboration among the Caribbean countries, is
an inter-governmental agency, the proposed methodology can be extended to other contexts,
where umbrella organizations and members of the collaboration may be humanitarian agencies
such as the IFRC and its national agencies.
Given that lead time has appeared as a critical parameter in our study, one could develop
models that consider alternative procurement options, such as framework agreements with global
suppliers and local sourcing. Recently, it was suggested by CDEMA that we look into local
markets for procuring supplies. The evaluation of local market capacity would be important
for that region. Moreover, potential costs that may be incurred while transitioning to the new
collaborative network, such as moving the existing inventory from the current facilities to the
new ones, can be explicitly considered in future models. The reallocation of supplies among
the warehouses could also be incorporated in the response phase (second-stage) of the model
by considering the dynamic information updates related to wind speed intensity and the path
of a hurricane. Another concern of CDEMA is the state of the countries’ infrastructure in the
aftermath of a hurricane. While our model already considers the destruction of relief items as
well as the temporary unavailability of access to infrastructure, such as port facilities, piers,
warehouses and mechanical handling equipment, more accurate estimates could be obtained
through the study of past data to try and predict the future absorption and onward distribution
capacities of each state. In the same vein, there should be some consideration for transport
modes used outside the existing commercial infrastructure, such as chartered vessels and aircraft,
as well as military assets. We are currently supporting CDEMA in conducting a study on the
assessment of the logistics infrastructure and post-disaster capacities in the Caribbean (e.g., local
market, port and airport capacities after a strong hurricane). This will enable the development
of future optimization models that incorporate disaster response operations in this region in a
more explicit way.
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Our work can also lead to future methodological advances in multiple directions. For instance,
the model we have developed rests on the generation of scenarios based on historical data. More
accurate predictions could be obtained through the use of climate change models pertaining to
hurricanes, namely those that exploit the estimated influence of anthropogenic climate change
(Mann and Emmanuel, 2006) and long-term trends in the frequency and intensity of tropical
cyclones (Knutson et al., 2010). Considering some Latin American countries and also other
types of disasters affecting the region such as earthquakes and floods may help achieve larger
collaboration savings and improve regional capacity and integration. Therefore, it would be
of interest to explore how to maximize risk pooling benefits in collaborative prepositioning
networks and how to include other type of disasters in our demand scenarios.
In addition, the proposed insurance-based methodology can be adapted to other collaborative
settings for cost and risk sharing. Furthermore, our work extends naturally to the adaptation
of alternative insurance principles in order to model the risks associated with humanitarian
supply chains. An interesting application of insurance theory to our collaborative prepositioning
network could focus on setting country-specific upper coverage limits (i.e., MCL) by considering
the demand distributions of the countries. However, the implications of country-specific MCL
on total investments, country premiums and fairness of the cost allocation must be carefully
evaluated. Since demand scenarios depend on MCL values, incorporating MCL as a decision
variable may require devising a new methodology for cost allocation. Finally, alternative cost
sharing methods can be developed to fairly allocate the costs associated with the collaborative
prepositioning network among the members. One option is the use of the Shapley value (Shapley,
1953) which has been applied to apportion costs and benefits among several collaborating actors
in a variety of logistics contexts, for instance in the horizontal cooperation of freight carriers
(Krajewska et al., 2008). Other fair allocation methods that can be adopted to collaborative
prepositioning include the alternative cost avoided method (Tijs and Driessen, 1986) and the
equal profit method (Frisk et al., 2010), which were considered by Verdonck et al. (2016) in a
cooperative facility location problem setting.
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Appendix A. Processing Hurricane Data and Generating Scenarios
We have examined historical hurricane tracks from three different databases focusing on a period
between 1950 and 2017, but the characteristics of the events reported by different databases
are sometimes different. We have therefore validated and merged the available information from
these three databases. While EM-DAT involves information related to the total number of
affected people, it does not report the category of the hurricane hitting a country. On the other
hand, HURDAT and the CHN database report the categories, but do not contain information
related to the affected population. In cases where HURDAT and the local database reported
different categories for the same hurricane and the same affected country, we accepted the
category provided by HURDAT. Moreover, there exist some hurricane events that are only listed
in EM-DAT. To assign a category to such event, we explored the Internet to find related reports
(e.g., from the NOAA, The Weather Network (2019) and ReliefWeb (2019)), and we identified
the category of the storm hitting country.
EM-DAT reports the number of affected people for some of the 188 events in our data set.
When we analyzed data on the number of affected people in a given country, we found the
population of the country in the year of the event and we calculated the percentage of affected
population. In most of the countries, the population has changed significantly over the years.
For instance, MST’s population decreased significantly. We recorded the largest percentage of
affected population for each country, denoted by Lc, which is later used to develop demand
scenarios associated with a hurricane of a given strength. For some countries such as BVI
and MST, EM-DAT does not report any data on the number of affected people for the past
hurricanes. For such countries, we considered the percentage of population affected by the same
event and the same category in the close neighbouring countries, and we calculated the largest
percentage of affected population accordingly.
The data on the category of the hurricanes were also used to estimate effects of a hurricane,
based on their wind speed. The storms are classified into mild (M), strong (S) and very strong
(VS) categories. We kept the mild storms in our data set since i) they may still cause disastrous
situations due to rainfall and flooding, ii) the strength of a storm may change along its track
and a country hit mildly may later be affected by a stronger event. As a result, for each country
we kept the total number of events, and the percentage of events with different categories.
After processing the historical hurricane data, we developed hurricane scenarios. For each of
the 62 seasons, we kept the hurricane tracks and their timing fixed, and randomly generated five
scenarios differing from each other in terms of the severity of the hurricane hitting a country and
of the size of the affected population. The size of the affected population was generated consid-
ering both the severity category and Lc. In total, we generated 310 different and equiprobable
scenarios. We assigned a category to the countries on a track according to the percentage of the
past events with M, S and VS categories. For example, JAM was hit by 26 events between 1950
and 2017, 77% of which belonged to the M category, while 8% of them were S, and 15% were
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VS. Based on these percentages, we determined the number of scenarios with a specific strength
for each country starting from the VS category. Specifically, for the JAM example, we generated
d5× 0.15e= 1 event from the category VS, d5× 0.08e= 1 event from S, and 5− 1− 1 = 3 events
from M. For each scenario, we then generated an estimate for the affected number of people in
the hit countries. In particular, for each country c ∈C, we considered its population Popc, Lc,
and the category of the hurricane. We then calculated Πc = max{50,Lc} ×Popc, which repre-
sents the size of the largest population that we target in our planning. An integer number chosen
randomly from the interval [0,Πc × 20/100] was assigned as number of affected population in
country c, due to a hurricane of category M. For categories S and VS, we randomly generated the
number of affected people from the intervals (Πc× 20/100,Πc× 50/100] and (Πc× 50/100,Πc],
respectively. This allowed us to take into account the exposure of the countries to the hurricanes
and the impact that hurricanes of different categories can have on the number of affected people.
We then divided these population values by five, which is the average family size. Finally, if
the number of family kits (targeted demand) generated by this procedure was larger than the
prespecified MCL value, we accepted the MCL value as the demand of a country in a scenario.
We generated scenarios following this procedure because we did not have data on the countries’
targeted demand. However, if such information was provided, the number of family kits could
be replaced by the targeted demands and adjusted (bounded) according to the MCL value.
Appendix B. Data Used for the Computational Experiments
Table 8 Family kit contents and characteristics
Item Quantity Unit price Unit weight Unit volume
(USD) (kg) (m3)
Hygiene kit 1 24.15 7.80 0.037
Jerrycan 2 6.30 0.35 0.004
Blanket 5 25.20 3.30 0.010
Mosquito net 2 8.40 0.86 0.003
Tarpaulin 2 29.40 9.36 0.022
Shelter tool kit 1 26.25 11.30 0.035
Kitchen set 1 24.15 6.40 0.019
Plastic bucket 1 3.68 0.89 0.008
Total 147.53 40.26 0.137
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